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by R.J. Benton

Download Kant’s Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments eBook
ISBN:
9024720559
Author:
R.J. Benton
Category:
Humanities
Language:
English
Publisher:
Springer; 1977 edition (January 31, 1978)
Pages:
172 pages
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One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed.

One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed. This failure is particularly fatal in dealing with the Critiques, since in interpreting them it is important to keep clearly in mind that it is not this or that cognition that is at stake, but the possibility of (a certain kind of) knowledge as such. Show all. Table of contents (8 chapters).

Similar books and articles. Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason and Continental Philosophy: Heidegger's Interpretation of Transcendental Imagination. Daniel Dahlstrom - 2010 - In Paul Guyer (e., The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press. The Metaphysics of Kantian Epistemology. Avery Goldman - 2002 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:239-252. Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism. Adrian M. S. Piper - 1993 - Philosophical Forum 24 (1-3):188-232. Science and the Synthetic Method of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint).

Kant's Second Critiqu" and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments. Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint).

On this site it is impossible to download the book, read the book online or get the contents of a book. The administration of the site is not responsible for the content of the site. The data of catalog based on open source database. All rights are reserved by their owners. Download book Kant's second Critique and the problem of transcendental arguments, Robert J. Benton.

Transcendental arguments found a place in philosophy after Kant, including in the post-Kantian German .

Transcendental arguments found a place in philosophy after Kant, including in the post-Kantian German idealist tradition (cf. Franks 1999, Franks 2005: 201–59, Taylor 1976, Beiser 2005: 174–91, Rockmore & Breazeale 2014, Nance 2015; but for some critical discussion of Taylor see Stern 2013 and Houlgate 2015, and of Beiser see Stern 2012). The first was offered by Hilary Putnam in relation to external world skepticism once again, and the second by Donald Davidson, this time relating more directly to the problem of other minds.

Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. I will examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I clarify the rationale for scientific perspectivism and the problems and challenges that perspectivism faces in delivering a form of realism. In particular, I concentrate my attention on truth, and on ways in which truth can be understood in perspectival terms. I offer a cost-benefit analysis of each of them and defend a version that in my view is most promising in living up to realist expectations.

A transcendental argument is a deductive philosophical argument which takes a manifest feature of experience as granted, and articulates which must be the case so that experience as such is possible. Transcendental arguments may have additional standards of justification that are more demanding than those of traditional deductive arguments.

Benton, Robert J. (1977) Kant’s Second Critique and the Problem of Transcendental Arguments. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Benton, Robert J. (1980) ‘Kant’s Categories of Practical Reason as Such’. Kant-Studien, 71, 181–201. Bobzien, Susanne (1988) ‘Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant’.

Электронная книга "Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant", J. B. Schneewind. Эту книгу можно прочитать в Google Play Книгах на компьютере, а также на устройствах Android и iOS. Выделяйте текст, добавляйте закладки и делайте заметки, скачав книгу "Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant" для чтения в офлайн-режиме.

This work is in no way intended as a commentary on the second Cri­ tique, or even on the Analytic of that book. Instead I have limited myself to the attempt to extract the essential structure of the argument of the Analytic and to exhibit it as an instance of a transcendental argument (namely, one establishing the conditions of the possibility of a practical cognitive viewpoint). This limitation of scope has caused me, in some cases, to ignore or treat briefly concrete questions of Kant's practical philosophy that deserve much closer consideration; and in other cases it has led me to relegate questions that could not be treated briefly to appendixes ,in order not to distract from the development of the argu­ ment. As a result, it is the argument-structure itself that receives pri­ mary attention, and I think some justification should be offered for this concentration on what may seem to be a purely formal concern. One of the most common weaknesses of interpretations of Kant's works is a failure to distinguish the level of generality at which Kant's argument is being developed. This failure is particularly fatal in dealing with the Critiques, since in interpreting them it is important to keep clearly in mind that it is not this or that cognition that is at stake, but the possibility of (a certain kind of) knowledge as such.