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by G. E. M. Anscombe,G. H. von Wright,Denis Paul,Ludwig Wittgenstein

Download On Certainty (Harper Perennial Modern Thought) (English and German Edition) eBook
ISBN:
0061316865
Author:
G. E. M. Anscombe,G. H. von Wright,Denis Paul,Ludwig Wittgenstein
Category:
Humanities
Language:
English German
Publisher:
Harper & Row (September 6, 1972)
Pages:
192 pages
EPUB book:
1117 kb
FB2 book:
1925 kb
DJVU:
1965 kb
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Rating:
4.2
Votes:
723


The Blue and Brown Books (Harper Perennial Modern Thought).

The Blue and Brown Books (Harper Perennial Modern Thought). 2) The "natural history" of human beings On Certainty responds to Wittgenstein's reading of Moore's "common sense" papers, particularly "Proof of an External World" and "A Defense of Common Sense".

On Certainty (German: Über Gewissheit, original spelling Über Gewißheit) is a philosophical book composed from notes written by Ludwig Wittgenstein over four separate periods in the eighteen months before his death on 29 April 1951.

Anscombe and von Wright). Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - Harper Torchbooks. G. E. M. Anscombe & George Henrik von Wright (ed. - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell. A. Palmer - 1972 - Mind 81:453. Why Certainty is Not a Mansion. Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright, A. C. Danto & M. Bochner - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):261-262. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty. Avrum Stroll - 1994 - Oxford University Press.

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Главная The Philosophical Quarterly On Certaintyby Ludwig Wittgenstein; G. Anscombe; G. von Wright . Whether you've loved the book or not, if you give your honest and detailed thoughts then people will find new books that are right for them. 1. The Elusive Mindby H. D. Lewis. von Wright; Denis Paul. The Philosophical Quarterly 1971, 04 Vol. 21; Iss. 82. On Certaintyby Ludwig Wittgenstein; G. Volume: 21. Journal: The Philosophical Quarterly. File: PDF, 113 KB. 2. Beliefby H. Price.

ber Gewissheit On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty is a philosophical book composed from . The only thing Wittgenstein is certain of is that there's something fishy about philosopher .

ber Gewissheit On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty is a philosophical book composed from notes written by Ludwig Wittgenstein over four separate periods in the eighteen months before his death on 29 April 1951. Moore's assertions "I know that that's a tree" or "I know that here is a hand" or "I know that I have never been far above the earth's surface.

This book is in English, translated from the original German. Bookseller The volume is full of thought-provoking insights which will prove a stimulus both to further study and to scholarly disagreement

Von Wright, G. 1979, ‘The Origin and Composition of the Philosophical Investigations’, in von Wright (1983), pp. 111–36.

E. Anscombe and Denis Paul (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) as OC; Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) as PG; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, ed. Brian McGuinness, trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979) as WVC; and Zettel, eds. Anscombe and G. von Wright, trans. Von Wright, G. 1983, Wittgenstein, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Wittgenstein's earliest extant texts. German, with an English translation by G. Anscombe]. Book Condition: Good ex-lib. These included a large number of notebooks from the time of germination of the tractatus. Three of these last survived, however, by the accident of having been left in the house of his youngest sister, Mrs. Stonborough, at Gmunden, instead of in Vienna. Published by New York:, Harper & Brothers, 1961. Condition: Good ex-lib. navy cloth Soft cover.

Harper Perennial Modern Thought. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Austria and studied at Cambridge under Bertrand Russell. By (author) Ludwig Wittgenstein, By (author) G. Von Wright, Illustrated by G. Anscombe. He volunteered to serve in the Austrian army at the outbreak of World War I, and in 1918 was captured and sent to a prison camp in Italy, where he finished his masterpiece, Tractatus, one of the most important philosophical works of all time. After the war Wittgenstein eventually returned to Cambridge to teach.

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defense of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

  • Nagor
Best work by LW and his very last work. This is the real deal, deeply insightful and poignantly concise--he's the poet of "Analytic Philosophy." I received my grad degree from a Philosophy of Language Department where studying Wittgenstein was the main event and been teaching for 25 years. However, On Certainty is not --I mean NOT a good "starter" book or introduction to Wittgenstein's work. The Blue and Brown Books or the first half of the Philosophical Investigations are good but On Certainty is not for novices. You have to work for this one and have some background. Secondary readings by Ray Monk or read about the infamous Vienna Circle. Reading about Wittgenstein is fasinating and helpful. Heck he wrote logic in the fox holes and was a war hero. Intriguing German family--he gave his tremendous wealth away to live in the Alps and teach school children. There is a rich and textured history here of one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th Century, who also influenced --was a game changer for many disciplines. Don't give him short shrift. As Wittgenstein said in the beginning of the Investigations, "I would't want to spare you the trouble of thinking"
  • Ral
LW's attempt to address the debate between radical skepticism and GE Moore's claim to "know" various facts with certainty. Much of the book is a quite subtle discussion of how language about knowledge, certainty, and doubt is used in practice and by philosophers. But the discussion is non-linear; it repeatedly circles back to previously-discussed issues, but with slightly different takes on the topic. This is at times illuminating, and other times frustrating.
LW is said to be difficult to access and understand. I can believe it. But I also suspect this is one of his more readable books, so for someone who is interested in how LW practices philosophy, it should be a good "beginner" primary text. (N.B. The book is relatively short -- the printed edition is twice as long as it would otherwise be because of the inclusion of the original German text.)
  • Doukasa
If it's okay to talk about "favorite" philosophy books, On Certainty is on my list. I've come back to it over and over since first reading it about 30 years ago.

Two themes stood out this time, maybe the two themes that I've always thought were most important.

1) Distinguishing "grammatical" propositions from empirical ones
It's hard to talk about this briefly, but, roughly, "grammatical propositions", for Wittgenstein, are statements about how we speak. Elsewhere and here, he remarks on our commonly mistaking the one for the other. For example, he remarks on the physicist Eddington having "discovered" that tables (and other physical objects) aren't really solid, given that they are mostly made up of the space within and between atoms. He says that Eddington is actually proposing a change in the way that we speak, changing how we use the word "solid", rather than simply reporting an empirical observation. The line is blurry -- certainly empirical observations are relevant to the proposed change in the way we speak. Nevertheless, it is a powerful distinction. Wittgenstein is interested in correcting our tendency to be misled by such statements into some sort of false mysterious profundity, as here, in the kinds of skepticism and idealism under examination in his time.

But the distinction may also be useful in more common circumstances -- what about the statement "Life begins at conception (or quickening or birth or . . . )"? Is that statement empirical, or is it more a recommendation about how we should use the word "life"? If the latter, how does that change the debate about the rightness or wrongness of abortion rights? Both sides try to lend their argument more weight by treating such a statement as an empirical one, a "fact". Likewise G.W. Bush saying that "The US doesn't torture." Did that function for him as a factual statement, or a decision about how we are going to use the word "torture"?

2) The "natural history" of human beings
On Certainty responds to Wittgenstein's reading of Moore's "common sense" papers, particularly "Proof of an External World" and "A Defense of Common Sense". Moore in turn was responding to Kant's declaration of a "scandal to philosophy" that we can't (in quasi-ordinary words) prove the existence of a world outside our minds. Moore believed he could provide such a proof. But it's really the picture behind the felt need to provide such a proof that is bothersome and important. It calls up a picture of human beings creating "knowledge" in their minds by observing and reasoning about a world "outside their minds". Wittgenstein's arguments tend toward a less intellectualized and more natural relationship between human beings and the world, something more akin to what gets called "coping" by later writers (e.g., Heidegger).

We don't need to "know" or "prove" the existence of an external world, since we live in the world. In fact, the very attempt to prove its existence makes its existence questionable, now that these propositions (e.g., "There is a world external to my mind") are articulated. The compulsion to ask, now that we've articulated them, whether we know them or knew them before we articulated them, seems already to be a mistake. Such propositions weren't there before articulating them, and what they try to express didn't function as "knowledge" per se. Our situation is much more akin, as Wittgenstein says (jokes?), to a squirrel's apparent knowledge that winter will come and so he'd better store nuts against it -- squirrels don't infer that winter will come from past winters coming. Nor we do we, as Moore tries to do, establish the existence of a "world external to our minds" by inferring its existence from some more primitive facts that we know to be true.