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Download Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) eBook

by Jonathan Rodden

Download Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) eBook
ISBN:
0521603668
Author:
Jonathan Rodden
Category:
Social Sciences
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (December 26, 2005)
Pages:
336 pages
EPUB book:
1862 kb
FB2 book:
1820 kb
DJVU:
1538 kb
Other formats
lrf lit mbr doc
Rating:
4.9
Votes:
434


Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Rodden's book takes a nuanced approach to this question with careful hypotheses that interact federal autonomy with national and local fiscal discipline.

Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. He then tests the hypotheses with data from OECD countries. Highly recommended for student of political economy and/or federalism. One person found this helpful.

Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Download (pdf, . 3 Mb) Donate Read

Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). 3 Mb) Donate Read. Epub FB2 mobi txt RTF. Converted file can differ from the original. If possible, download the file in its original format.

Cambridge University Press. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a d central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures.

Hamilton's Paradox The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism Cambridge Studies in Comparative Polit.

The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism. Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics. Territorial Politics in Hard Times: The Welfare State under Pressure in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom

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A key question is whether a d central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures

Hamilton's Paradox book .

Hamilton's Paradox book. Published March 16th 2006 by Cambridge University Press (first published January 1st 2005). Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). 0521603668 (ISBN13: 9780521603669). Just started this comparative study of fiscal dynamics and institutional development in federal states, focusing on postwar Germany, Brazil, and the US.

By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book provides a new . Publisher:Cambridge University Press.

book by Jonathan A. Rodden. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. 0521603668, 0521842697. Your reading intentions are private to you and will not be shown to other users. What are reading intentions? Setting up reading intentions help you organise your course reading. It makes it easy to scan through your lists and keep track of progress. Here's an example of what they look like: Your reading intentions are also stored in your profile for future reference. How do I set a reading intention.

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book provides a new perspective on why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.