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Download The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) eBook

by Murray J. Horn

Download The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) eBook
ISBN:
0521484367
Author:
Murray J. Horn
Category:
Social Sciences
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (November 24, 1995)
Pages:
276 pages
EPUB book:
1871 kb
FB2 book:
1617 kb
DJVU:
1762 kb
Other formats
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Rating:
4.5
Votes:
346


The stronger legal orientation in the public administration in Finland .

The stronger legal orientation in the public administration in Finland, however, made strategic changes more complicated in Finland than in Norway. Boston and Pallot (1997) described the New Zealand model of integrated strategic planning and performance management in government, as it was evolving in the mid-1990s. The study of public finances through the lens of political science and public administration is becoming a political science topic. A growing body of literature is studying how different formal institutions, such as fiscal rules or powers of the finance minister, affect fiscal policy outcomes (Von Hagen 2008).

Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Paperback: 276 pages. Horn provides a compelling explanation for why government administration is the way it is, using an analysis of transactions costs. Publisher: Cambridge University Press (November 24, 1995). The book is littered with examples, mostly from the . Best of all, while Horn uses some game theory, he doesn't get bogged down in it. His writing and exposition are extremely clear.

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This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector. It defines the distinctive governance, financing and employment arrangements that characterize the common forms of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau and the state-owned enterprise. Categories: Computers\System Administration.

Start by marking The Political Economy of Public Administration . This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector

Start by marking The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. Details (if other): Cancel. This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector.

Institutional Choice in the Public Sector. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.

Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650-1913 (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). The Political Economy of the Japanese Financial Big Bang: Institutional Change in Finance and Public Policymaking. Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). by Murray J. Horn Political economy of institutions and decisions. 350. Library of Congress. Published 1995 by Cambridge University Press in Cambridge, New York, NY. Written in English. Political economy of institutions and decisions. ix, 263 p. ; Number of pages.

Political economy is the study of production and trade and their relations with law, custom and government; and with the distribution of national income and wealth. As a discipline, political economy originated in moral philosophy, in the 18th century, to explore the administration of states' wealth, with "political" signifying the Greek word polity and "economy" signifying the Greek word "okonomie" (household management).

This book uses a transactions cost approach to explain the key institutional characteristics across the public sector. It defines the distinctive governance, financing and employment arrangements that characterize the common forms of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau and the state-owned enterprise. It suggests why these forms are used to perform different administrative functions, and why legislators often leave very important decisions to be resolved at the administrative level.
  • Clonanau
Brilliant book. Horn points out something obvious but sadly discounted in much of the literature - legislatures don't often violate bureaucratic autonomy. Horn provides a compelling explanation for why government administration is the way it is, using an analysis of transactions costs. In particular, Horn shows that legislatures establish public administration in order to minimize delegation, administrative, commitment, and uncertainty costs. The book is littered with examples, mostly from the U.S. Best of all, while Horn uses some game theory, he doesn't get bogged down in it. His writing and exposition are extremely clear. Recommended for students of bureaucracy.
  • Tebei
Transaction cost theory has been applied to public administration since early 1980s. However, most of these researches are not very sucessful, thus making many public administration theorists suspect the promises of using transaction cost theory to public administration. It is at this critical point that Horn prove to us that transaction cost theory is an attractive theory for public administration research. The Horn model is concentrated on the legislature institutional choices. To him, institutional choices of the legislature will be affected by various transaction costs, and the legislature must trade-off among these transaction costs. It is obvious that the Horn model had followed the Williamsonian transaction cost theory rather than North's perspective of transaction cost theory. However, different from other theorists using Williamsonian transaction cost theory to public administration, Horn had not limited himself to the narrowing category of Market and Hierarchy. In sum, this Horn model combined recent work of Williamson (Private and public bureaucracy: perspective of transaction cost theory, 1999)has convinced students like me that transaction cost theory is a productive perspective for public administration research.