almediah.fr
» » The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy)

Download The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) eBook

by Maurice Merleau-Ponty,James M. Edie,William Cobb

Download The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) eBook
ISBN:
0810101645
Author:
Maurice Merleau-Ponty,James M. Edie,William Cobb
Category:
Philosophy
Language:
English
Publisher:
Northwestern University Press; 1 edition (June 1, 1964)
Pages:
228 pages
EPUB book:
1882 kb
FB2 book:
1706 kb
DJVU:
1190 kb
Other formats
txt azw lrf mobi
Rating:
4.6
Votes:
781


Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher; he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 at age 53. He wrote many books such as The Visible and the Invisible,Signs,Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem,The Structure of Behavior,The Prose of the World,In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, etc.

The Primacy of Perception book. The Primacy of Perception brings together a number of important studies by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961. The title essay, which is in essence a presentation of the underlying thesis of his The Primacy of Perception, is followed by two courses given by Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne on phenomenological psychology.

William Cobb, James M. Edie. The title essay, which is in essence a presentation of the underlying thesis of his Phenomenology of Perception, is followed by two courses given by Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne on phenomenological psychology. Eye and Mind" and the concluding chapters present applications of Merleau-Ponty's ideas to the realms of art, philosophy of history, and politics.

And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the . Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher.

And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Karl Marx, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger in addition to being closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre (who later stated he had been "converted" to Marxism by Merleau-Ponty ) and Simone de Beauvoir.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Edie, James M. Date. Northwestern University studies in phenomenology & existential philosophy. Northwestern University Press. Evanston, Ill. Volume. 0810101645, 0810101653. 0810101645,0810101653,0810101645,0810101653. This item appears on. List: K14RTA Rethinking Technology in Architecture.

This book consists of Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy

This book consists of Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Appointed Professor at the College de France in 1952, Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a highly esteemed professional philosopher because of his technical works in phenomenology and psychology.

The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, James M. Edie, William Cobb. Download (pdf, 1. 8 Mb) Donate Read.

The Primacy of Perception brings together a number of important studies by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961

The Primacy of Perception brings together a number of important studies by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961.

On July 20, we had the largest server crash in the last 2 years. Full recovery of all data can take up to 2 weeks! So we came to the decision at this time to double the download limits for all users until the problem is completely resolved. Thanks for your understanding! Progress: 9. 7% restored.

JOURNAL NAME: Psychology, Vo. N., March 26, 2014. ABSTRACT: If the nist cognitive approaches have been characterised by the metaphor of the edifice, of the solid Cartesian rock, all the forms of knowledge founded on complexity theory have been characterised by the metaphor of the network, of thinking in relationships, in a dynamic, fluid, open manner

Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
  • Cordalas
The introductory chapter alone (M-P's own prospectus of his work) is worth the price.

"We never cease living in the world of perception, but we go beyond it in critical thought - almost to the point of forgetting the contribution of perception to our idea of truth. For critical thought encounters only bare propositions which it discusses, accepts or rejects. Critical thought has broken with the naive evidence of _things,_ and when it affirms, it is because it no longer finds any means of denial. However necessary this activity of verification may be, specifying criterion and demanding from our experience its credentials of validity, it is not aware of our contact with the perceived world which is simply there before us, beneath the level of the verified true and the false. Nor does critical thought even define the positive steps of thinking or its most valid accomplishments." Page [3]

Published in 1962, this "prospectus" appears to be written much earlier, perhaps yet in the 1940s, summarizing the ideas that motivated M-P's first two books (The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception) and the thinking that led to much of his subsequent work.

From the Editor's comment to this chapter: "...one keenly regrets the death which brutally interrupted the élan of a profound thought in full possession of itself..."

I recommend this book highly to anyone willing to understand the background of M-P's thought.
  • Gavinrage
Excellent
  • Dagdatus
the isnt much written on existential philosophy but this did the trick
  • Sennnel
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher; he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 at age 53. He wrote many books such as The Visible and the Invisible,Signs,Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem,The Structure of Behavior,The Prose of the World,In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, etc.

The editor wrote in the Introduction, “The purpose of this volume is to bring together and to present to the English-speaking world a number of important and hitherto scattered studies …. Which appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961… The content of the present volume was dictated solely by the fortuitous circumstance that the studies included here represent the most important of Merleau-Ponty’s writings which still remain untranslated… since each one deals with a different question, and since they are of very unequal length, this volume cannot but appear to be a somewhat heteroclite and miscellaneous collection.”

Merleau-Ponty wrote in the first essay, “Now if perception is thus the common act of all our motor and affective functions, no less than the sensory, we must rediscover the structure of the perceived world through a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge.” (Pg. 5)

He begins the second essay, “The unprejudiced study of perception by psychologists has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects … that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the validity of the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to the unity of a proposition, as understood by several thinkers, any more than perceived existence is comparable to ideal existence. As a result we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which ‘interprets,’ ‘deciphers,’ or ‘orders’ a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses.” (Pg. 12)

He goes on, “But there is a third meaning of the cogito, the only solid one: the act of doubting in which I put in question all possible objects of my experience. This act grasps itself in its own operation…and thus cannot doubt itself. The very fact of doubting obturates doubt. The certitude I have of myself is here a veritable perception: I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and constitutes the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act: and it is in this sense that I am certain of myself. Thought is given to itself; I somehow find myself thinking and I become aware of it. In this sense I am certain that I am thinking this or that as well as being certain that I am simply thinking. Thus I can get outside the psychological cogito---without, however, taking myself to be a universal thinker.” (Pg. 22)

At the end of this essay, he states, “If… as the primacy of perception requires, we call what we perceive ‘the world,’ and what we love ‘the person,’ there is a type of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible. Certainly, the world which we thus find is not absolutely reassuring… But it is TRUE, and the moment of this promise, that our love extends beyond QUALITIES, beyond the body, beyond time, even though we could not love without qualities, bodies, and time.” (Pg. 26-27)

In a later essay, he asserts, “How can pretend as a philosopher that one is holding truths, even eternal truths, as long as it is clear that the different philosophies, when placed in the psychological, social, and historical frame where they belong, are only the expression of external causes? In order to practice philosophy, in order to distinguish between the true and the false, it is necessary for the philosopher to express not merely certain natural or historical conditions external to him but also a direct and internal contact of the mind with itself, an ‘intrinsic’ truth which seems impossible so long as research in the field of the human sciences shows that at each moment this mind is externally conditioned.” (Pg. 44)

In another essay, he observes, “the question of a causal sequence of the two phenomena is meaningless. For it to be meaningful would require that the two phenomena be capable of standing in isolation. But this is never the case. In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in which the child structures … his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. He himself is the one who structures his surroundings, after all… it is impossible to establish a cleavage between what will be ‘natural’ in the individual and what will be acquired from his social upbringing. In reality the two orders are not distinct; they are part and parcel of a single global phenomenon.” (Pg. 107-108)

As the editor noted, this is a somewhat disjointed collection; but it will be of value to anyone studying Merleau-Ponty’s thought.
  • Quttaro
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher; he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 at age 53. He wrote many books such as The Visible and the Invisible,Signs,Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem,The Structure of Behavior,The Prose of the World,In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, etc.

The editor wrote in the Introduction, “The purpose of this volume is to bring together and to present to the English-speaking world a number of important and hitherto scattered studies …. Which appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961… The content of the present volume was dictated solely by the fortuitous circumstance that the studies included here represent the most important of Merleau-Ponty’s writings which still remain untranslated… since each one deals with a different question, and since they are of very unequal length, this volume cannot but appear to be a somewhat heteroclite and miscellaneous collection.”

Merleau-Ponty wrote in the first essay, “Now if perception is thus the common act of all our motor and affective functions, no less than the sensory, we must rediscover the structure of the perceived world through a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge.” (Pg. 5)

He begins the second essay, “The unprejudiced study of perception by psychologists has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects … that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the validity of the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to the unity of a proposition, as understood by several thinkers, any more than perceived existence is comparable to ideal existence. As a result we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which ‘interprets,’ ‘deciphers,’ or ‘orders’ a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses.” (Pg. 12)

He goes on, “But there is a third meaning of the cogito, the only solid one: the act of doubting in which I put in question all possible objects of my experience. This act grasps itself in its own operation…and thus cannot doubt itself. The very fact of doubting obturates doubt. The certitude I have of myself is here a veritable perception: I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and constitutes the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act: and it is in this sense that I am certain of myself. Thought is given to itself; I somehow find myself thinking and I become aware of it. In this sense I am certain that I am thinking this or that as well as being certain that I am simply thinking. Thus I can get outside the psychological cogito---without, however, taking myself to be a universal thinker.” (Pg. 22)

At the end of this essay, he states, “If… as the primacy of perception requires, we call what we perceive ‘the world,’ and what we love ‘the person,’ there is a type of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible. Certainly, the world which we thus find is not absolutely reassuring… But it is TRUE, and the moment of this promise, that our love extends beyond QUALITIES, beyond the body, beyond time, even though we could not love without qualities, bodies, and time.” (Pg. 26-27)

In a later essay, he asserts, “How can pretend as a philosopher that one is holding truths, even eternal truths, as long as it is clear that the different philosophies, when placed in the psychological, social, and historical frame where they belong, are only the expression of external causes? In order to practice philosophy, in order to distinguish between the true and the false, it is necessary for the philosopher to express not merely certain natural or historical conditions external to him but also a direct and internal contact of the mind with itself, an ‘intrinsic’ truth which seems impossible so long as research in the field of the human sciences shows that at each moment this mind is externally conditioned.” (Pg. 44)

In another essay, he observes, “the question of a causal sequence of the two phenomena is meaningless. For it to be meaningful would require that the two phenomena be capable of standing in isolation. But this is never the case. In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in which the child structures … his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. He himself is the one who structures his surroundings, after all… it is impossible to establish a cleavage between what will be ‘natural’ in the individual and what will be acquired from his social upbringing. In reality the two orders are not distinct; they are part and parcel of a single global phenomenon.” (Pg. 107-108)

As the editor noted, this is a somewhat disjointed collection; but it will be of value to anyone studying Merleau-Ponty’s thought.